

The Relationship between Witchcraft and Religion in Tanzania  
(1965)

A Preliminary Analysis

by

Katrina E. Wheelan\*

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\*Research assistant, African-Caribbean Institute (Hanover, NH) and Williams College student. Comments to [kewheelan@gmail.com](mailto:kewheelan@gmail.com)

## Summary

All statistical analysis in this document is based on data from a survey carried out in three diverse districts in 1965 Tanzania. This paper analyzes and explains the relationship between belief in witchcraft and several factors including age, location, economic status, economic mobility, leadership role, years of education, literacy, and religion. The central thesis is that the single most important factor in determining belief in witchcraft is religion. Several other factors are weakly associated with belief in witchcraft, but most can be explained by religion as a confounding variable.

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## Introduction

In 1965 Tanzania, witchcraft was a widespread belief. More than 80% of rural Tanzanian villagers believed or partially believed that some humans have the power to use magic to harm others.<sup>2</sup> Witchcraft is also important as a political tool; many Tanzanian villagers joined the political party under threat of harm by witchcraft. An entire market exists around buying and selling charms to guard against the ill-effects of witchcraft.

This paper provides a profile of the typical witchcraft-believer and identifies the factors that contribute to this belief. The single strongest predictor of witchcraft belief is religion. Most other variables—education, economic status, location, etc—are associated with witchcraft belief, but the association disappears when the test is controlled for religion. Witchcraft-believers are not necessarily poor and uneducated, they just tend to belong to a religious community in which most villagers are poor and uneducated.

In 1965, Dr. Norman Miller surveyed 434 villagers in three different regions of Tanzania: Rungwe, Kisarawe, and Tabora. Kisarawe is a coastal region near the capital. Rungwe and Tabora are rural, landlocked districts. Rungwe is the furthest south, near Tanzania's southern border.

Dr. Miller distributed a questionnaire with more than 100 questions about economic status, social views, and political knowledge. With the help of a translator, he collected responses from 434 villagers. The respondents were chosen at random from the tax rolls, and the sample was stratified by leadership role. Because Dr. Miller made a conscious effort to include village, district, and local leaders, these groups may be disproportionately represented in this sample. The tax rolls from which Dr. Miller selected the sample only included property-owners, and only men could own property. Thus, it is important to understand that findings in this paper are true exclusively for the sampled group: property-owning men in three specific Tanzanian districts in 1965.

This survey is a sample of a larger population: male, property-owning villagers in Kisarawe, Rungwe, and Tabora. Because this survey was not a census, confidence intervals were used to estimate proportions in the entire population. This paper consistently uses a 95% confidence level. This means that we are 95% confident that the true selected proportion in the entire population lies within the bounds of the confidence interval.

All hypothesis (significance) tests use an alpha-level of 5%. This means a p-value of 0.05 was the threshold for rejecting the null hypothesis. A p-value of less than 0.05 means the probability of the given result—assuming the null hypothesis—is less than 5%. A p-value below the alpha-level is adequate evidence to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternate hypothesis. Confidence intervals and

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<sup>2</sup>95% confidence interval: 79.6 - 87.0%

p-values are shown in footnotes. Each of these statistical tests were calculated using R, a computer platform for statistical analysis.

The survey assessed belief in witchcraft based on the villagers' opinion on the statement "Humans have the ability to harm others through magic". The respondents indicated that they agreed with, disagreed with, or were uncertain about the statement. More than half of the male villagers surveyed in 1965 agreed that "humans have the ability to harm others through magic."<sup>3</sup> 84% of the villagers in these regions agreed or were uncertain about the existence of witchcraft.<sup>4</sup>

Most of the statistical tests required a binary variable (ie. belief and non-belief in witchcraft). Because of this restraint, the "agree" and "uncertain" responses were collapsed into a single "believe/partially believe" category. This is consistent with previous research. A villager who is "uncertain" about the existence of witchcraft does not *deny* its existence and thus can still be influenced by claims of witchcraft.

Although the data from the original surveys are fifty years old, many of the factors that contribute to belief in witchcraft are the same today. A more recent study by Amy Miller Eberhart—Dr. Miller's daughter—found that 76% of surveyed male villagers in Tabora and Kisarawe District believed in witchcraft in 2005. The belief rate has decreased slightly, but witchcraft is still a large part of life in rural Tanzania. This paper investigates witchcraft-belief in three sections: demographics, socioeconomic status, and education. Each section relates the relevant variables to belief in witchcraft.


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<sup>3</sup>95% confidence interval: 56.5% - 66.1%

<sup>4</sup>95% confidence interval: 79.6% - 87.0%

### Geographic Background

The Miller survey included villagers from three districts: Kisarawe, Rungwe, and Tabora. The appropriate borders of the districts in 1965 are shown on the map below (note that these borders have shifted since 1965).



Kisarawe is a rural region that borders the Indian Ocean on Tanzania's east coast, near the capital—Dar es Salaam. The survey included thirteen villages in Kisarawe, but most of the respondents were concentrated in Kisarawe Village, Sungwi, Maneromengo, and Mbwamaji. Despite its proximity to the coast and to Dar es Salaam, Kisarawe was the poorest of the three districts in 1965. The average income was about 637 Tanzanian shillings<sup>5</sup>, which is equivalent to about 695 USD in 2016.<sup>6</sup>

Rungwe is a landlocked region near the southern border of Tanzania. In 1965, Rungwe was the least educated district; the average villager attended only 2.9 years of school.<sup>7</sup> Just over half the villagers were literate.<sup>8</sup>


<sup>5</sup>95% confidence interval: \$466.17 - \$807.49

<sup>6</sup>One 1965 USD = seven 1965 Tanzanian Shillings (Dr. Miller's approximation); \$1 in 1965 = \$7.64 in 2016 (calculated using the annual consumer price index)


<sup>7</sup>95% confidence interval: 2.4 years - 3.4 years

<sup>8</sup>95% confidence interval: 0.488 - 0.655

Tabora is a large district in the heart of Tanzania. The survey reached four villages in Tabora: Kipanga Sikonge, Ugenge-Uyui, Upege, and Usagari. Tabora was the wealthiest and most educated district.<sup>9,10</sup>



The religious composition of the districts varied greatly. Kisarawe is mostly Muslim, a result of centuries of Muslim sailors and slave-traders. Tabora, which was also on the slave route, has a large Muslim majority. Rungwe, a more remote district, was never visited by Muslim slave-traders. The majority of villagers in Rungwe are Christian, a result of various Christian missionaries. Most of the Rungwe villagers who were not converted to Christianity practiced traditional or folk religions (these villagers were classified as “Pagan” at the time of the survey and are referred to as such in this paper for the sake of consistency).



Belief in witchcraft also varies by district. Belief is the highest in Rungwe district and the lowest in Tabora.


<sup>9</sup>95% confidence interval: 3.8 years - 4.9 years

<sup>10</sup>95% confidence interval: \$859.37 - \$1268.25

## I. Demographics of Witchcraft-Believers

### *Religion*

Belief in witchcraft (an “agree” or “uncertain” response) was significantly higher among Pagans<sup>11</sup> and among Muslims<sup>12</sup> than among Christians. Within the Christian population, the fewest Lutherans believed in witchcraft and the most Moravians believed in witchcraft. However, the sample size of Lutherans is too small to claim a statistically significant difference in witchcraft belief between Christian denominations.



### *Location*

Because the religious breakdown of the villages varies by district, it is difficult to isolate the causal variable. Rungwe has the highest incidence of witchcraft-belief, but it also has the largest Pagan population. In order to determine whether religion or location has a stronger association with belief in witchcraft, a significance test was conducted to identify regional differences within a single religion:


<sup>11</sup>P-value:  $0.014 < 0.05$ ; reject null that belief is same for Christians and Pagans

\*NOTE: Pagan sample size of non-believers is less than 10\*

<sup>12</sup>P-value:  $0.0205 < 0.05$ ; reject null that belief is the same for Muslims and Christians

	Non-Rungwe Christians	Rungwe Christians
<b>Believe/Partially Believe</b>	40	67
<b>Do Not Believe</b>	16	15
<b>Belief Percentage</b>	71.4%	81.7%

The difference in witchcraft belief between Christians in Rungwe and Christians in the other two regions combined is not statistically significant.<sup>13</sup> The slight (insignificant) difference in belief between Christians in Rungwe and Christians not in Rungwe is the result of either random variation in the sample or by the breakdown of specific Christian denominations in Rungwe. The majority of the Christians are Moravian, and a high proportion of Moravians believe in witchcraft (see figure on previous page).



Because there is only a single represented sect of Islam (Sunni), the comparison between villagers of the same religion is clearer than the comparison between Christians of many different sects. Below is a table representing witchcraft belief in the Muslim community in two districts (Rungwe does not have a large enough Muslim population to be included).


<sup>13</sup>P-value: 0.078 > 0.05; fail to reject null that belief is the same for Christians in different districts

	<b>Kisarawe</b>	<b>Tabora</b>
<b>Believe/Partially Believe</b>	102	65
<b>Do Not Believe</b>	15	11
<b>Belief Percentage</b>	87.2%	85.5%

As in the case of the Christians in both districts, the difference in witchcraft belief between Muslims in different districts is not statistically significant.<sup>14</sup> This suggests that location is not a good predictor of witchcraft belief.

### *Age*

Villagers who did not believe in witchcraft tended to be younger than those who did believe in witchcraft. The median age of non-believers is 37, and the median for witchcraft believers is 42 years (the respondents ranged in age from 18 to 75). The mean age of believers was five years greater, and the difference was statistically significant.<sup>15</sup>



<sup>14</sup>P-value: 0.3712 > 0.05; fail to reject null that belief among Muslims varies by district

<sup>15</sup>Welch Two Sample t-test (degrees of freedom = 100.37)

p-value = 0.002357 < 0.05; reject null that belief is the same for older and younger villagers

### *Interim Conclusion*


Belief in witchcraft varies significantly by religion. Pagans and Muslims have significantly higher rates of witchcraft belief than Christians and villagers of other (non-Christian, non-Islamic) faith. Belief in witchcraft also varies by district, but this variation is most likely caused by the difference in religion composition. The proportion of witchcraft-believers of an isolated religion does not vary in a statistically significant way by district. Non-believers tend to be younger than villagers who do believe in witchcraft.

## **II. Witchcraft and Socioeconomic Status**

### *Material Wealth*

Several of the survey questions related to the villagers' possessions (cars, bicycles, radios, animals, etc). We summarized these statistics in a single material wealth score: the total monetary value of each villager's possessions. We then grouped the villagers into classes based on their material wealth. Villagers with a total material wealth of zero were "lowest class", villagers with zero to 200 dollars in material wealth were "middle class", and villagers with more than 200 dollars of material wealth were "highest class." Material wealth was closely associated with income.

### **Histogram of Material Wealth**




Approximate Value of Various Items (in 2016 USD)\*:

<b>Bicycle</b>	\$100	<b>Shotgun</b>	\$150
<b>Chicken/Ducks</b>	\$5	<b>Motorcycle</b>	\$400
<b>Goats/Sheep</b>	\$30	<b>Milling machine</b>	\$20
<b>Cattle</b>	\$150	<b>Farming equipment</b>	\$50
<b>Car/Truck</b>	\$1,000		

\*Price estimates by Dr. Miller

Belief in witchcraft trends downward as socioeconomic status (as measured by material wealth) increases. Interestingly, the proportion of villagers who believe entirely in witchcraft (excluding those who are uncertain) increases as socioeconomic class increases. The difference in witchcraft belief in the middle and highest classes is not statistically significant<sup>16</sup>, but the difference between the lowest and middle classes is statistically significant.<sup>17</sup>




<sup>16</sup>P-hat for highest class: 0.81967; P-hat for middle class: 0.80769

pValue: 0.39967 > 0.05; fail to reject null that belief is the same in the highest and middle classes

<sup>17</sup>P-hat for lowest class: 0.88636; P-hat for middle class: 0.80769

pValue: 0.03347 < 0.05; reject null that belief is the same for the lowest and middle classes

Just as in the previous section, we must control for confounding variables to isolate the effect of only class on belief in witchcraft. The graph below illustrates the class composition of each of the major religions.



Interestingly, Pagans—the religion with the highest incidence of witchcraft belief—are disproportionately upper class. On the contrary, Muslims—who also have a high incidence of witchcraft belief—are disproportionately lower class. To determine the association between class and witchcraft *only*, we compare incidence of witchcraft belief in two classes of a single religion. In order to divide the class groups as evenly as possible, Christians and Pagans are divided into low/middle class and higher class, while Muslims are divided into lower class and middle/higher class.

#### Belief in Witchcraft by Class and Religion

	<b>Christians</b>	<b>Muslims</b>	<b>Pagans</b>
Lower	74%	91%	93%
Higher	83%	82%	88%

Although there appears to be a difference in belief based on class, the difference is neither consistent nor statistically significant. Christians have a higher proportion of witchcraft belief in the upper class, but the difference is not statistically significant.<sup>18</sup> Muslims and Pagans have a higher proportion of


<sup>18</sup> P-value: 0.1295 > 0.05; fail to reject null that belief is the same for lower and higher class Christians

believers in the lower class. The sample of Pagans is too small to claim statistical significance, but the difference between Muslim classes is statistically significant.<sup>19</sup> Overall, there is a weak association between material wealth and belief in witchcraft; the association only holds between the lowest and middle classes and, when controlled for religion, only in the Muslim population.

### *Economic Mobility*


In addition to considering static wealth, this test considered each villager's change in income in the past two years to determine the general trend of villagers' economic well-being and determine if there is a difference in economic mobility.

**Change in Real Annual Income 1962-1964**



Entire Population

**Change in Real Annual Income 1962-1964**



By Belief in Witchcraft

In the entire surveyed population, more than half of the villagers (55%) saw their real income decrease over the two year period.<sup>20</sup> Slightly more of the villagers who believed or partially believed in

<sup>19</sup>P-value:  $0.03597 < 0.05$ ; reject null that belief is the same for higher and lower class Muslims


<sup>20</sup>Note: The Tanzanian government underwent a period of expansionary monetary policy in the decade after independence that resulted in high inflation. Because the exact inflation rate is not well-documented for the early 1960s, I use the average inflation rate for the later 1960s (1967-1985) to calculate the currency depreciation from 1962 to 1964. I used this rate to calculate the *real* rather than nominal change in income during this period. These numbers are accurate assuming accurate inflation figures and assuming that purchasing power in these villages is

witchcraft increased their income from 1962 to 1964, but the difference is not statistically significant.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, belief in witchcraft is not associated with economic mobility.

### *Leadership Role*

District leaders comprised about 21% of the surveyed villagers. The remaining 79% of surveyed villagers were farmers, expert farmers, and/or village council members. Among the leaders, 74% believed or were uncertain about the existence of witchcraft. 87% of the non-leaders believed or were uncertain about the existence of witchcraft. The difference in belief across the groups is statistically significant.<sup>22</sup>

However, we must consider several confounding factors: religion, education, and income. The graph below illustrates the difference in religious composition of the two groups (leaders and nonleaders). Note that there are no Pagan district leaders, and there are a disproportionate number of Christian district leaders. The higher Pagan population in the non-leader cohort may partially explain the higher incidence of witchcraft belief.



generally equal to the national average. (Inflation figures come from <http://dSPACE.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/32127/1/RP138.pdf?1>).

<sup>21</sup> P-value: 0.2288 > 0.05; fail to reject null that the income *increase* is the same for believers and non-believers; P-value: 0.05196 > 0.05; fail to reject null that the income *decrease* is the same for believers and non-believers

<sup>22</sup>P-Value: 0.00245 < 0.05; reject null that belief is the same for leaders and non-leaders

When leadership role is controlled for religion, the difference in witchcraft belief is still significant.<sup>23</sup> 85% of Christian non-leaders believed or partially believed in witchcraft, while only 64% of the Christian district leaders believed or partially believed in witchcraft. This suggests that both religion and leadership role are associated with belief in witchcraft. Because leadership role may be a proxy for years of education or literacy; education is evaluated as a factor in witchcraft belief and by religion in the next section.

### *Interim Conclusion*

Economic class—based on material wealth—is associated with belief in witchcraft, but only between the lowest and middle/upper class; there is no significant distinction between the middle and upper class. The difference in class may be affected by the difference in religious composition. The test to control for religion is inconclusive because the sample size is too small. The test suggests that there is a difference in witchcraft-belief between Muslims of different classes, but not a large difference in belief between classes in other religions. Overall, class appears to have a weak association with belief in witchcraft.

Belief in witchcraft does not have a significant association with economic mobility as measured by change in real income over a two-year period. Belief in witchcraft is association with leadership role, even when controlled for religion. District leaders had a lower incidence of witchcraft belief than village councilmen and farmers.

## **III. Education**

### *Years of Education and Literacy*


Non-believers of witchcraft were significantly more educated than those who believed in witchcraft. The average witchcraft-believer had completed one and a half to three and a half fewer years of school than the average non-believer.<sup>24</sup> The literacy rate among believers of witchcraft is also significantly lower.<sup>25</sup>

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
<sup>23</sup> P-value:  $0.00343 < 0.05$ ; reject null that belief in witchcraft is the same for Christian leaders and Christian non-leaders

<sup>24</sup>95% confidence interval: 3.66 years - 1.62 years more of schooling for non-believers

<sup>25</sup>P-hat for believers: 0.600; Non-believers: 0.776; P-value:  $0.00319 < 0.05$ ; reject null that literacy rate is the same for believers and non-believers of witchcraft



Again, we must evaluate this finding in the context of religion. Here is the religious composition of the poorly educated and well-educated cohorts:




Pagans are the least educated, and Christians are the most educated. The literacy rates for Pagans, Muslims, and Christians are 32%,<sup>26</sup> 60%,<sup>27</sup> and 83%<sup>28</sup> respectively. The difference in literacy rates is statistically significant between each religion.

<sup>26</sup>95% confidence interval: 21.2% - 44.6%

<sup>27</sup>95% confidence interval: 52.8% - 66.7%

<sup>28</sup>95% confidence interval: 75.7% - 88.5%



If belief in witchcraft is associated with education only, we would expect villagers of different religions but the same educational attainment to believe in witchcraft at the same rate. In order to isolate religion and education as factors, we created the matrix below with six distinct groups: less educated Muslims, well-educated Muslims, less educated Christians, well-educated Christians, less educated Pagans, and well-educated Pagans. The “less educated” cohort has received less than four years of schooling and/or is illiterate. The “well educated” cohort has received four or more years of education and is literate. Assuming that both religion and education contribute to belief or non-belief in witchcraft, we would expect each orthogonal comparison to be statistically significant.

**Six Groups to Isolate Religion and Education**

	<b>Less Educated*</b>	<b>Well-Educated**</b>
<b>Christians</b>	Less educated Christians	Well-educated Christians
<b>Muslims</b>	Less educated Muslims	Well-educated Muslims
<b>Pagans</b>	Less educated Pagans	Well-educated Pagans

### **Six Groups with Percent Belief in Witchcraft**

	<b>Less Educated*</b>	<b>Well-Educated**</b>
<b>Christians</b>	95.6%†	68.8%
<b>Muslims</b>	89.4%	82.2%
<b>Pagans</b>	90.7%†	88.9%†

**\*less than four years of school and/or illiterate**

**\*\*at least four years of school and literate**

**†Sample size too small for proportion analysis**

The difference in witchcraft belief between well-educated Christians and well-educated Muslims is significant.<sup>29</sup> This means Muslims are more likely to believe in witchcraft regardless of education level. There are too few poorly educated Christians who do not believe in witchcraft to run a significance test with that group.<sup>30</sup> The sample size of both Pagan groups are also too small to run significance tests.<sup>31</sup>

Islam was the only religion with large enough samples in both education groups. The difference between less educated and well-educated Muslims was not significant.<sup>32</sup> Although we cannot statistically prove it, Pagans appear to follow the same trend—there is minimal difference in rates of belief between groups of differing educational attainment. Christians do not follow this trend, either because of the small sample size or because the composition of sects for poorly and well-educated villagers varies. Even when we compare villagers with no schooling at all to villagers with some schooling, the difference in witchcraft belief is not significant when we control for religion.<sup>33</sup> We cannot prove that education is associated with belief in witchcraft when controlled for religion.

#### *Interim Conclusion*

Pagans are disproportionately poorly educated, and Christians are disproportionately well-educated. Pagans also have higher rates of belief and Christians have lower rates of belief.

<sup>29</sup>P-value: 0.01763 < 0.05; reject null that belief is the same for well-educated Christians and well-educated Muslims

<sup>30</sup> In order to run a significance test, both np and nq must be at least 10. In this case, nq = 2.

<sup>31</sup>nq = 5 and 1 for poorly and well educated groups respectively.

<sup>32</sup>P-value: 0.07422 > 0.05; fail to reject null that belief is the same for less and well-educated Muslims

<sup>33</sup>P-hat for Muslims with no education: 0.882; P-hat for Muslims with some education: 0.8492; P-value: 0.2623 > 0.05; fail to reject null that belief is the same for Muslims with no education and Muslims with some education

The association between education and belief in witchcraft is confounded by religion; when controlled for religion, there is not enough evidence to suggest that quantity of education is associated with belief in witchcraft.

### **Summary of Key Findings**

The strongest association with witchcraft is religion. Pagans and Muslims had the highest rate of witchcraft-belief, and Christians had the lowest rate.

The average age among witchcraft believers was higher than among non-believers. This trend was still significant when controlled for religion.

The difference in belief by district was only a factor because of the different religion compositions in each district.

Material wealth appears to have a weak association with belief in witchcraft. The difference in belief is significant between the lowest and middle economic classes, but not between the middle and highest classes. When controlled for religion, there is still a weak association between class and belief in the Muslim population, but not in other religions.

Belief in witchcraft is not associated with economic mobility; there was no significant difference in income change between believers and non-believers.

Leadership role does matter. Even when controlled for religion, villagers in district leadership positions were significantly less likely to believe in witchcraft than all other villagers.

Villagers who did not believe in witchcraft attended more years of school on average and had a higher literacy rate than villagers who did believe in witchcraft. However, this finding is strongly affected by religion. Literacy rates and education levels vary greatly by religion. Religions with the least educated villagers tended to be the same religions with the highest incidence of witchcraft; however, there was no statistically significant difference between poorly and well-educated villagers of the same religion. Therefore, there is not enough statistical evidence to verify that education is associated with belief in witchcraft when controlled for religion (see table I).

Table I.

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Statistically significant association with belief in witchcraft?</b>	<b>Statistically significant association when controlled for religion?</b>
Religion	Yes; Pagans and Muslims have higher rates of belief than Christians.	NA
Location	Yes	No; districts have different religious compositions.
Age	Yes; older villagers are more likely to believe in witchcraft.	Yes
Material wealth	Yes; lower class villagers believe at a higher rate than upper or middle class villagers.	No; not enough evidence.
Economic Mobility	No; change in income is not associated with belief in witchcraft.	NA
Years of School	Yes; villagers who do not believe in witchcraft have attended more years of school on average.	No; not enough evidence.
Literacy	Yes; villagers who do not believe in witchcraft have a higher literacy rate.	No; not enough evidence.

### Selected Bibliography

The Village Leadership Database from Norman Miller's Field Work (1964-65) were used in later studies. The data were also used in a re-study by Amy Miller Eberhart of some of the same villages in 2005. Literature that has flowed from this study include the following:

- I. Miller, Norman N. *Encounters with Witchcraft: Field Notes from Africa*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2012.
- II. Miller, Norman N. "Village Leadership and Modernization in Tanzania: Rural Politics Among the Nyamwezi People of Tabora Region." 1967. (PhD dissertation, Indiana University).
- III. "The Rural African Party: Political Participation in Tanzania." *The American Political Science Review* 64.2 (1970): 548-571.  
Reprinted in:
  - A. Uphoff, N.T. and W.F. Ilchman, eds. *The Political Economy of Development*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1972. 425-439.
  - B. Miller, Norman N. "The Rural African Party: Political Participation in Tanzania." *Papers in International and World Affairs*. 1970 series – October – No. 4. Lansing: Michigan State University International Programs. 37-60.
- IV. "Political Mobility and the Pedestrian Society." *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 4.1 (1970): 17-31.
- V. "Witchcraft and Sorcery in Tanzania." *Fieldstaff Perspectives*. Hanover, NH, American Universities Field Staff, 1970.
- VI. "Tanzania: Documentation in Political Anthropology - the Hans Cory Collection." *African Studies Bulletin* 11.2 (1968): 195-213.
- VII. "The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6.2 (1968): 183-198.
- VIII. "The Defeat of a Minister." *One Party Democracy: The 1965 Tanzania General Elections*. Ed. Lionel Cliffe. East African Publ. House: N.p., 1967. IV.
- IX. "Witchcraft and Sorcery in Tanzania - Part I: The General Dimensions." *American Universities Field Staff Reports* VIII.1 (1969): 1-18.
- X. "Witchcraft and Sorcery in Tanzania - Part II: Cases for Analysis." *American Universities Field Staff Reports* VIII.3 (1969): 1-19.
- XI. "Witchcraft and Sorcery in Tanzania - Part III: Biography of a Witch-Finder." *American Universities Field Staff Reports* VIII.4 (1969): 1-17.